Oh, let me climb those ladders again,
machinery gray steel ladders,
to the pilot house with an open bridge,
the enclosed pilot house holding
the large helm for steering her by
and
the engine order telegraph for the lee helmsman
to send the orders to main control
for speeds and engine revolutions
and
at the center gyroscope repeater
just below the portholes
looking out on the forecastle
shine the flashlight’s red light
on the captain’s night orders,
signing them as if in blood
to relieve the officer of the deck,
announcing
i have the deck and the conn,
and
when the off-going watch has struck below,
walk out to that open bridge
to scan the horizon to determine
if there are any contacts about,
undetected by combat information center,
with the olive-green foul weather jacket
zipped to the top,
with the cover pulled down
to face the wind,
feel it biting into my cheeks,
smelling the salt and the sea,
awed by the millions of heavenly objects,
take a breath, a deep breath,
and
say to myself:
when you are feeling the wind
on a ship at sea
you are alive.

The Hawkins was qualified in gunnery, but we had one more live fire exercise before heading back to Newport. We left our station off of Calibre and headed to Vieques. We arrived in the early evening, anchored off the range, and around 2200, began the exercise. i think in the world of Allied Tactical Publications it was designated as Z-49-G, a night time gunnery mission.

The key figure in this exercise was the Sky One Director, Joe McMakin, who had surprised everyone when his counter battery fire in the qualifying exercise at Calibre.

The ship would get a call for fire from a forward gunfire liaison officer (GLO) — on ranges, this would be the range director. To abet the vision of the GLO, the after-mount, 53, would fire rounds carrying white phosphorous we called “willy peter” into the sky. They were timed to off above the area for the call to fire. When they detonated they released the willy peter on a parachute, which would slowly descend to the range, lighting up the area for firing.

The after mount would continue this alternating with each of its two guns, coordinated by Sky One, the director officer. The GLO would would send the coordinates for the area target to the ship’s Gunfire Support Director — i sure i have erred in the names of some of the positions in the fire control system — which was now Ralph Clark, the new director in Combat (CIC). He would send the directions to the officers on the MK 1 computer below and then give the order to fire with forward mount 51. Sky One would coordinate the firing of “willy peter” rounds from the after mount.

At least that was the way it was supposed to go. But Joe got a little confused and not much was going right. i stood by the captain as his voice over the fire control circuit. Big but taciturn CDR Max Lasell was growing frustrated, very frustrated. He turned to me and told me to notify him in the best way possible if some emergency occurred. With that warning, he stepped back into the pilot house, strode across it, exiting on the starboard side. From there he headed aft and climbed the ladder to the O4 level.

i could see him again as he scaled the side of the Sky One director. Joe was sitting at the top frantically trying to get the guns coordinated without much success. He had on that ginormous sound powered phone battle helmet and completely unaware the captain was climbing up the outside of the director. It was noisy.

When Max reached the top and his yell could not gain Joe’s attention, he began to beat…er, tap, on Joe’s battle helmet with his binoculars.

i don’t know what Captain Lasell said to Joe. i wish i did. The conversation was short. The captain descended from his precarious perch and returned to the bridge wing where i awaited.

Miraculously, the gunfire became coordinated, we took the GLO’s spots and moved the rounds until we were on target and began firing for effect. The night shoot went from looking like a complete disaster to a success.

Standing by the captain is the primo spot for watching a night gun shoot on a FRAM destroyer. i was lucky. i wish everyone could have that opportunity, now vanished. i still have no need to watch fireworks. If i do, it’s because i’m being accommodating for someone else to watch.

They always pale in comparison to that night shoot off of Vieques about fifty-five years ago.

This installment has taken some time. i wanted to include names of friends who were part of the story. i have been partially successful, but i’m disappointed. Just a month or so ago, i ran across the USS Hawkins wardroom social roster from my two years on board, Now when i need it, i cannot find it anywhere. So, i guess i will add missing names later.

i planned to post this before Christmas. Oops. i’m still looking for that roster. Right now, i’m trying to remember the name of the Supply Officer in 68-69. his first name was Dave. Good guy and great wardroom caterer. If any old Hawkins sailor remembers his name, please let me know.

And may you all have a terrific 2024.

The Hawkins left GTMO in the first of March of 1969 if i remember correctly. We had done well except for gunnery. We could go operational if we did well in the gun shoots on the Naval gunfire range on the island of Calibre. A night shoot was scheduled afterwards off the Vieques Navy range.

Ralph Clark was now the Gunfire Support Director. Ralph was Ops and Senior Watch Officer. He was, in my estimation, an outstanding Naval officer. i don’t recall who was the officer in computer room. But Joe McMackin was the Sky One Fire Control officer. Joe had graduated from Weslyan and was as gentle a soul that ever lived. Super good guy, but he had not done well as the director of Sky One.

For those unfamiliar with Navy gunfire support at the time, Sky One was the director that sat on the signal bridge on destroyers. The officer in charge of Sky One sat at the top with a sight that he used to target incoming enemy aircraft and directly shoot at land targets. The sight could control each and all of the gun mounts. Joe’s job in the primary gunfire support exercise was to interrupt the calls to fire when the ship received fire from ashore. In the exercise (Z-48-G i think was the nomenclature for this exercise), the officer ashore in charge of the exercise would detonate a white phosphorus charge on the range to simulate an enemy firing at the ship. The proper procedure was the Sky One Officer would notify the other gunfire support stations (there was a term i cannot remember), take control of the guns and return fire at the enemy.

This had not gone well during GTMO’s non-firing refresher training. The captain, CDR Max Lasell expressed his concern as we anchored off Calibre and prepared for the critical exercise that would allow us to become combat operational if we passed. i continued to be the captain’s communication link with the gun fire sound powered phone circuit, standing by his side throughout any gun exercise.

The exercise was going well. Ralph Clark’s control of the calls for fire and adjustments were effective. Then, the white phosphorous charge on the range went off. Joe saw it, took control, and fired one round from the forward mount. It was a direct hit on the target and snuffed the willie peter (gunner’s mate term for white phosphorous) out.

The Hawkins passed the exercise with a 98% score.

We were operational.

The Hawkins was closing down its refresher training in GTMO in early April 1969. We had done pretty well except for one area of the ready for sea criteria we worked on for two-plus months.

That would be in gunnery, especially gunfire support. Trying to refrain from demeaning folks, the problem was the weapons officer. CDR Lasell recognized the problem and removed him as the gunfire support director who controlled the guns from a plot in Combat Information Center (CIC).

LT Ralph Clark was put in charge and for a reason i cannot explain, the captain appointed me his sound-powered phone talker on the JV(?) circuit, the one where the director communicated with Sky 1, the director and the gear-grinding, analogue, fire control computer Mark 1 Able deep down in the bowels of the ship. My job was to pass to the captain all that was happening on the circuit, and pass along his commands to the others on the circuit. It was unique. i was also pleased the CDR Lasell trusted me enough to do this.

We improved quite a bit before final day of simulated battle.

There was one part in which we concerned. The problem being put under simulated attack by attack aircraft. We had learned from other FRAMS that invariably, the flyover would be synchronized with the trainers in engineering. Thus as the aircraft approach the trainers would induce a casualty that would create a loss of electrical power. That, of course, would require the ship to combat the air attack manually.

Now for those who have never experienced this, think of 3500 tons of steel hurtling around the ocean at 35 knots, evading attacking aircraft with turns inducing heeling and rolls while the sky one fire control director is trying to manually aim the four large guns slaved to his director at aircraft maneuvering at 400 knots And those massive twin 5 inch, gun mounts are pivoting in sync with the director. Insane. Even keeping your balance was tough, especially while trying to simply watch the intense maneuvering of the aircraft .

But we had a plan.

Here i must explain there are at least two versions of what happened next. Joe Conway, who was the CIC officer at the time, has told me he was sitting at the O-Club bar the night before and the guy next to him was in the aviation side of the base. This guy casually mentioned to Joe the overhead times the aircraft would reach the Hawk during the battle problem. My version is below:

The Operations Officer (OPS) boss came up with the idea, discussed it with the CO, and recruited the Supply Officer (SUPPO) and me to pull off the dirty deed. We left in the motor whale boat in the middle of the afternoon, and tied to the pier. We found a phone booth that was rather isolated in between two rows of buildings. i stood watch at the end of the row. i was supposed to warn OPS and SUPPO if anyone was coming. SUPPO made the call while OPS coached him, making sure he said what they had rehearsed.

It was just before liberty call when SUPPO called flight operations office in the air facility tower.

“This is LCDR Fritz* at the Fleet Training Group office. We are going through the battle problem for the Hawkins tomorrow and want to confirm the overhead time for your aircraft. *Dave used the name and rank of the officer we knew was in charge of the battle problem. The air controller checked his papers and told Dave when the aircraft would conduct the simulated air strike.

We laughed all the way back to the ship on the boat ride. When we told the CO and the XO, they laughed along with us.

In spite of the engineering casualty, we were ready for the airstrike. We raised our grade in gunnery, but it was just below “passing.” It was close enough to give us a chance to go operational if we did well in the live fire gun shoots at Vieques and Calibre.