The Hawkins was closing down its refresher training in GTMO in early April 1969. We had done pretty well except for one area of the ready for sea criteria we worked on for two-plus months.

That would be in gunnery, especially gunfire support. Trying to refrain from demeaning folks, the problem was the weapons officer. CDR Lasell recognized the problem and removed him as the gunfire support director who controlled the guns from a plot in Combat Information Center (CIC).

LT Ralph Clark was put in charge and for a reason i cannot explain, the captain appointed me his sound-powered phone talker on the JV(?) circuit, the one where the director communicated with Sky 1, the director and the gear-grinding, analogue, fire control computer Mark 1 Able deep down in the bowels of the ship. My job was to pass to the captain all that was happening on the circuit, and pass along his commands to the others on the circuit. It was unique. i was also pleased the CDR Lasell trusted me enough to do this.

We improved quite a bit before final day of simulated battle.

There was one part in which we concerned. The problem being put under simulated attack by attack aircraft. We had learned from other FRAMS that invariably, the flyover would be synchronized with the trainers in engineering. Thus as the aircraft approach the trainers would induce a casualty that would create a loss of electrical power. That, of course, would require the ship to combat the air attack manually.

Now for those who have never experienced this, think of 3500 tons of steel hurtling around the ocean at 35 knots, evading attacking aircraft with turns inducing heeling and rolls while the sky one fire control director is trying to manually aim the four large guns slaved to his director at aircraft maneuvering at 400 knots And those massive twin 5 inch, gun mounts are pivoting in sync with the director. Insane. Even keeping your balance was tough, especially while trying to simply watch the intense maneuvering of the aircraft .

But we had a plan.

Here i must explain there are at least two versions of what happened next. Joe Conway, who was the CIC officer at the time, has told me he was sitting at the O-Club bar the night before and the guy next to him was in the aviation side of the base. This guy casually mentioned to Joe the overhead times the aircraft would reach the Hawk during the battle problem. My version is below:

The Operations Officer (OPS) boss came up with the idea, discussed it with the CO, and recruited the Supply Officer (SUPPO) and me to pull off the dirty deed. We left in the motor whale boat in the middle of the afternoon, and tied to the pier. We found a phone booth that was rather isolated in between two rows of buildings. i stood watch at the end of the row. i was supposed to warn OPS and SUPPO if anyone was coming. SUPPO made the call while OPS coached him, making sure he said what they had rehearsed.

It was just before liberty call when SUPPO called flight operations office in the air facility tower.

“This is LCDR Fritz* at the Fleet Training Group office. We are going through the battle problem for the Hawkins tomorrow and want to confirm the overhead time for your aircraft. *Dave used the name and rank of the officer we knew was in charge of the battle problem. The air controller checked his papers and told Dave when the aircraft would conduct the simulated air strike.

We laughed all the way back to the ship on the boat ride. When we told the CO and the XO, they laughed along with us.

In spite of the engineering casualty, we were ready for the airstrike. We raised our grade in gunnery, but it was just below “passing.” It was close enough to give us a chance to go operational if we did well in the live fire gun shoots at Vieques and Calibre.